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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) provide the foundation of our criti-
cal infrastructures, which form the basis of emerging and future
smart services and improve our quality of life in many areas. In
such CPS, sensor data is transmitted over the network to the con-
troller, which will make real-time control decisions according to
the received sensor data. Due to the existence of spoofing attacks
(more specifically to CPS, false data injection attacks), one has to
protect the authenticity and integrity of the transmitted data. For
example, a digital signature can be used to solve this issue. However,
the resource-constrained field devices like sensors cannot afford
conventional signature computation. Thus, we have to seek for an
efficient signature mechanism that can support the fast and contin-
uous message authentication in CPS, while being easy to compute
on the devices.
To this end, we introduce two Lightweight Signature schemes
(LiS), which are suitable for continuous message authentication
commonly seen in cyber-physical systems. In our constructions,
we exploit the efficient hash collision generation property of a
chameleon hash function to transform a chameleon hash function
into signature schemes. In our schemes, the signature of a message
m is the randomness r associated with m in a chameleon hash
function, such that they can lead to a hash collision with a given
message randomness pair (m′, r ′). Thus, the task of a signer is
to generate the collision using the private key of the underlying
chameleon hash function, and a verifier can verify the signature by
checking the hash collision with a known message and randomness
pair.
We also specifically instantiate the chameleon hash function
in such a way that it leads to a fast signing procedure and an
optimal storage requirement on the signer side. The optimized
signing algorithms are very efficient. Namely, our first scheme
requires only three additions and two multiplications, and only one
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additional hash is needed in the second scheme to resist adaptive
chosen message attacks. In addition, the size of the signing key in
our schemes is a small constant-sized bit string, which well fits CPS
applications.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate various cyber computation,
physical devices, and networking technology to control physical
processes through data exchange in real-time. The emerging CPS is
expected to encompass every aspect of our lives, which generates a
paradigm shift towards a hyper-connected society. Up to now, CPS
devices are widely used in navigation systems, smart grid, smart
city application domains. However, due to the limitation in both
computation and storage, many modern cryptographic schemes
cannot run on CPS devices, which results in serious security and
privacy issues [1–3].
Thus, it is notoriously important to ensure that the data that
comes from CPS devices has not been changed by attackers [4, 5].
A natural solution to protect the authenticity and integrity of a
message is to use a message authentication code (MAC). It allows
the verifier (who possess a shared key with the message sender) to
detect any change to the message content [6]. However, MAC has
a potential security risk: when the key stored on the verifiers gets
leaked, all the future message authentication codes will possibly
be compromised. Notice that, in more physically isolated CPS, like
nuclear plants and manufacturing systems, the verifiers (servers),
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are actually more vulnerable to cyber attacks than CPS devices.
This is because they are connected to enterprise networks or even
the Internet. For example, the famous Stuxnet worm compromised
the engineering workstations first in Iranian nuclear plants before
it got a footprint in the controller systems [1].
Another standard solution is to use cryptographic digital signa-
tures, which allow receivers to verify the origin of a message using
a ‘public’ key so that it can be secure in a verifier breach. Although
there are many online efficient (computationally secure) digital
signature schemes, such as ElGamal signature [7] and Schnorr
signature [8, 9], they require expensive cryptographic operations
like modular exponentiation which is too complex for resource-
constrained CPS devices.
Tomake a digital signature scheme deployable on constrained de-
vices, Even et al. proposed an online/offline signature paradigm [10].
The idea is to use a trusted and powerful server to pre-compute
some expensive operations in an offline phase, so the signer does
not need to compute complex operations, but the signer needs to
securely store a large number of private intermediate values D
generated by the server, and the size of D has a linear relation with
the number of signatures to be signed [10].
It is suggested in [11–13] that the offline phase for computing D
can be carried out either during the device manufacturing process
or by the device itself as a background computation. However,
none of these two ways of generating D is perfect in CPS. The
first solution requires a large amount of storage overhead on the
device (e.g., 97MB for seven-day usage with a message rate at 1
second per message [12, Schnorr]), but it is generally infeasible on
CPS devices. Although some sorts of replenishment of D might be
possible, it may interrupt the normal operation and communication
of the CPS devices, which need to keep sending data measured
in real-time. The second solution demands a lot of computational
power and idle time on the device side. However, the CPS devices
keep generating data at a fast pace, so there is no enough idle time
for it to compute these operations in the background. For example,
in an automatic identification system used on ships [14], each time
slot for sending a message is just 26.66 milliseconds, which is too
short for an exponentiation operation on an embedded device.
In this work, we are specifically motivated to design signature
schemes that can be efficiently used in CPS for continuous message
authentication. In particular, we introduce signature schemes that
are optimized for the signer, in terms of both computation over-
head and storage overhead, and the signer only needs to store a
constant-sized signing key which does not need to be replenished
for continuous and uninterrupted message authentication.
Our Work. Our construction leverages on a chameleon hash func-
tion [15] and a pre-computation strategy to shift the ‘burdens’ of
computation and storage from a signer to verifiers and possibly a
trusted third-party server. It is worth noting that the verifiers in
CPS are servers that have enough computation power and have
storage. Recall that, given a message and randomness pair (m′, r ′),
a chameleon hash function CHF allows one to use its secret key sk
to efficiently compute a collision r for a messagem ,m′ such that
CHF(m, r ) = CHF(m′, r ′). The general idea is to utilize a trusted
server to take as inputs a set of dummy message/randomness pair
(m′i , r
′
i ) (for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) and pre-compute the chameleon hash values
which will be used as a part of the verification key vk , where ℓ is
the maximum number of signatures can be verified by vk . For the
online signature generation, the signer only needs to compute the
collision ri as the signature ofmi based on a used dummy random
r ′i .
In order to further optimize the signing algorithm for the resource-
constrained signers, we propose to fix all dummy messagem′i as a
constantM , and use a universal hash function UHF to chain up all
dummy randomness, i.e., r ′i = UHF(k, r
′
i−1) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and r0 is
chosen randomly, where k is a random hash key ofUHF. As a result,
the signer only needs to store a few hundreds of bits (sk, sk ·M, r ′
0
,k)
for signing. Also, we applied some arithmetic tricks in our instantia-
tion of the chameleon hash function [15], which successfully saves
one big-number modular division in the signing algorithm. After
our extensive optimization, only three modular additions and two
modular multiplications are needed to generate one signature in our
first protocol LiS1. One additional hash computation is required in
the second protocol LiS2.
However, in the above naïve construction, the size of the verifi-
cation key is dominated by the pre-computed hash values. If the vk
can support the verification of many signatures (i.e., ℓ is large), then
vk may get very large too. To reduce the size of vk , we propose
to use a Bloom filter [16] to compress vk . For certain applications
that can tolerate small errors, such as Globe Positioning System
(GPS), we can even allow a relatively large false-positive rate for
the Bloom filter.
Nevertheless, the verification key of our schemes will still be
used up after ℓ signatures. We further develop two verification
key replenishment solutions to enable unlimited signing capability.
Notice that the chameleon hash keys (both secret and public key)
do not need to be changed after a verification key update, so the
signer can keep signing messages without being interrupted. In an
update of vk , the verifiers need to get a new set of authenticated
chameleon hash values for future verification. Our first verification
key replenishment approach is to outsource the computation of the
new chameleon hash values to a trusted server, which periodically
computes the chameleon hash values based on the dummy message
M and the dummy randomness r ′ and publishes them to a bulletin
(where verifiers have access) together with a signature of the server.
Moreover, the second verification key replenishment solution can
be used when all the verifiers are honest (and not controlled by
attackers). For instance, in industrial control systems, the verifier
can be a server located in an isolated control center, which is trusted
by all signer (i.e., the client devices). In this case, one can let the
verifier have the dummy messageM and dummy randomness r ′, so
it can generate the verification key on the fly during the verification
procedure. We specifically customized a verification algorithm for
this scenario. Notice that even if the dummy message/randomness
pairs (M, r ′i ) are leaked to an adversary, he still cannot forge a valid
signature without knowing the secret signing key.
Contributions.Wemade the following contributions in our paper:
(1) We propose two lightweight signature schemes LiS with an
optimized signing algorithm in terms of both computation
and storage. Our first protocol LiS1 is designed to sign small
messages and to provide security guarantee against weak
chosen message attacks, so it is suitable for the applications
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(such as GPS), which have an untamperable data source. We
extend our first protocol to the second one LiS2 by adding a
hash function, which is modeled as a random oracle, to not
only sign large messages, but also achieve adaptive security.
(2) We instantiate and optimize the proposed algorithms. As a
result, the signing algorithm of LiS1 requires three additions
and two multiplications, and one more hash is needed in
LiS2.
(3) We propose two verification key replenishment solutions
based on different assumptions of the verifiers. New verifi-
cation algorithms are designed for honest verifiers.
(4) We show the security results of our schemes with formal
security proofs. LiS1 and LiS2 are proved in the standard
model and the random oracle model, respectively.
(5) We implement our signature schemes and evaluate the per-
formance experimentally. Our results show that they are
efficient for continuous message authentication in CPS.
Organization. We introduce necessary preliminaries that will be
used frequently in the rest of the paper in Section 2. Section 3
presents a signature frameworkwith two concrete signature schemes
based on chameleon hash functions. The security of the proposed
schemes is analyzed in Section 4. We show instantiations and opti-
mizations in Section 5. Section 6 presents two verification key re-
plenishment solutions. Some candidate applications of our schemes
in cyber-psychical systems are discussed in Section 7. Performance
analysis and evaluation results are presented in Section 8. In Section
9, we review the literature related to our work. The paper concludes
in Section 10.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Here we briefly review the notions and cryptographic primitives
that our constructions rely on.
We denote with κ the security parameter, ∅ an empty string, and
with [n] = {1, . . . ,n} ⊂ N the set of integers between 1 and n. If X
is a set, then x
$
← X denotes the action of sampling a uniformly
random element from X . If X is a probabilistic algorithm, then
x
$
← X denotes that X is run with fresh random coins and returns
x . Let ∥ be an operation to concatenate two strings, | · | be an
operation to get the bit-length of a variable, and # be an operation
to get the number of elements in a set.
2.1 Universal Hash Functions
A universal hash function (UH) family [17]: KUH ×MUH → RUH,
refers to a family of hash functions which guarantees a low number
of collisions in expectation even, where KUH,MUH and RUH be
key, message and output space of UH, respectively. These spaces
are determined by the security parameter κ.
Definition 2.1. We say that a set of hash functions UH is univer-
sal hash function family if: i) we uniformly choose a hash func-
tion UHF ∈ UH by sampling a random hash key k
$
← KUH,




2.2 Chameleon Hash Functions
An important cryptographic primitive that we will use is chameleon
hash function [15]. A chameleon hash functionCH(pk, ·, ·) : PKCH×
MCH × RCH → YCH is associated with a pair of public key
pk ∈ PKCH and private key sk ∈ SKCH, where (PKCH,SKCH)
are public and private key spaces, respectively,MCH is the message
space, RCH is the randomness space and YCH is the output space.
These public/secret key pairs are generated by a PPT algorithm
(pk, sk)
$
← CHKGen(1κ ). If the key is clear from the context, we
will write CH(m, r ) for CH(pk,m, r ).
A hash value generated by CH(m, r ) on input a messagem and
a random string r satisfies the following properties:
• Collision resistance. There is no efficient algorithm that on
input the public key pk can output two pairs (m1, r1) and
(m2, r2) such that m1 , m2 and CH(m1, r1) = CH(m2, r2),
except with negligible probability in the security parameter
κ.
• Trapdoor collisions. There exists an efficient determinis-
tic algorithm CHColl that on input the secret key sk , and
(r ,m,m′) ∈ RCH ×MCH ×MCH, outputs a value r
′ ∈ RCH
such that CH(pk,m, r ) = CH(pk,m′, r ′).
• Uniformity. For an arbitrary public keypk output byCHKGen,
all messagesm ∈ MCH generate equally distributed hash val-
ues CH(m, r ) when drawing r
$
← RCH uniformly at random.
This property ensures that a third party is unable to examine
the value hash from deducing any information about the
hashed message.
Given an adversary A and a chameleon function CHF, the CH
security game GCH
A,CHF(κ) is defined in Figure 1.
Proc.Init() : Proc.Finalize(m,m′, r, r ′) :
(sk, pk )
$
← CHKGen(1κ ) If (m,m′) ∈ MCH
∧




CHF(m, r ) = CHF(m′, r ′)
OUTPUT 1
ELSE OUTPUT 0





1] the advantage of a PPT adversary A in breaking the security of
the chameleon hash function CHF under the security parameter
κ. We say CHF is secure if no PPT adversary has non-negligible
advantage AdvCH
A,CHF(κ).
The security of chameleon hash functions can be based on stan-
dard computational hardness assumptions like the discrete loga-
rithm assumption or the factoring assumption.
2.3 Digital Signature Schemes
We define a digital signature scheme SIG with three probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) algorithms (KGen, Sign, Verify). We assume
that a signature scheme is associated with public and secret key
spaces {PKSIG,SKSIG}, message spaceMSIG, and signature space
SSIG in the security parameter κ. We denote the bit-length of the
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space Rs by ℓs which is determined by κ. The algorithms of SIG
are defined as follows:
• KGen(1κ , ℓ, aux): This algorithm takes as input the security
parameter 1
κ
, the maximum number ℓ of signature that SIG
can generate, and an auxiliary input aux, and generates the
secret key sk and the verification key vk .
• Sign(sk,m): This is the signing algorithm that generates a
signatureσ ∈ SSIG for amessagem ∈ MSIG with the signing
key sk .
• Verify(vk,m,σ ): This is the verification algorithm that takes
as input a verification key vk , a messagem and a signature
σ , outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature form under vk , and 0
otherwise.
Here we consider both weak and adaptive chosen message at-
tacks against SIG. The resilience of weak chosen message attacks is
enough for specific applications that the signer may have reliable
message sources (for most of running time), e.g., sensors deployed
in an isolated environment, or the satellites that send GPS signals.
Besides, the weaker security notion allows us to achieve high perfor-
mance which is crucial for the resource-constrained devices in CPS.
Whereas, the adaptive security is needed in a more complicated
environment with sophisticated adversaries.
We define a security game GSIG
A,S(κ, ℓ) that is played between
an adversary A and a challenger based on a signature scheme
S, the security parameter κ, and the number ℓ that bounds the
signatures that the adversary can obtain. In the security game,
A may ask the procedures defined in Figure 2. Concretely, the
adversary A proceeds with the game by sequentially calling the
procedures Proc.Init, Proc.SQuery and Proc.Finalize. We stress that
we can obtain the adaptive security game by removing those boxed
steps or elements. Namely, the security notions that we defined are
also known as strongly existential unforgeable against weak chosen
message attacks (SEUF-wCMA) and strongly existential unforgeable
against adaptive chosen message attacks (SEUF-CMA), respectively.
Proc.Init( M ) : Proc.Finalize(m∗, σ ∗) :
(sk, vk )
$
← S.KGen(1κ , ℓ, M ): If S.Verify(vk,m∗, σ ∗) = 1
cnt := 0 ∧ (m∗, σ ∗) < QD








IF cnt ≥ ℓ OUTPUT⊥
σ := S.Sign(skidC,m)
cnt := cnt + 1
APPEND (m, σ ) → QD
OUTPUT(m, σ )
Figure 2: Procedures used to define security for SIG.
Definition 2.3. Let AdvSIG
A,S(κ, ℓ) :=
Pr[GSIG




the advantage of a PPT adversaryA in breaking the security of a sig-
nature scheme S under the security parameter κ. We say S is secure
if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage AdvSIG
A,S(κ, ℓ).
2.4 Bloom filter
Bloom filter [16] is a probabilistic data structure that provides space-
efficient storage of a set and that can efficiently test whether an
element is a member of the set. The probabilistic property of BF may
lead to false positive matches, but not false negatives. The more
elements are in the BF, the higher chance to get a false positive
match insertion. To reduce its false positive rate, we follow the
approach of [18], i.e., a BF with 1.44ϵN bits for a set with size N
has a false positive rate (FPR) of 2
−ϵ
.
We review the algorithms of a Bloom filter as follows:
• Init(N , ϵ): On input, a set size N , the initialization algorithm
initiates the Bloom filter of bit length 1.44ϵN .
• Insert(m): Element insertion algorithm takes an elementm
as input, and insertsm into BF.
• Check(m): Element check algorithm returns 1 if an element
m is in BF, and 0 otherwise.
• Pos(m): Position update algorithm computes positions to be
changed for elementm in BF.
3 LIS: LIGHTWEIGHT SIGNATURE SCHEMES
FROM CHAMELEON HASH
In this section, we propose a family of lightweight signature schemes
called as LiS = (LiS1, LiS2) from chameleon hash functions, Bloom
filters, and universal hash functions.
Figure 3: Overview of LiS. KGC stands for key generation center.
Design Rational. The system overview of LiS is shown in Figure
3. Our primary design goal is to enable the resource-constrained
signer device to authenticate its message in an extremely cheap
way, and the scheme should be resilient to verifier breaches. To
this end, we leverage on a chameleon hash function CHF and a pre-
computation strategy. In a naïve solution, one can simply compute
a verify point t = CHF(m′, r ′) based on a dummy messagem′ and
a randomness r ′, and send the t to the verifier for verification. To
authenticate a messagem online, the signer can compute a collision
x := CHColl(r ′,m′,m) as the signature form. The signer can repeat
the above procedure polynomial times to sign multiple messages.
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However, the above naïve solution is insecure since an adversary
can recover the secret key skCH of the chameleon hash function
given a pair of collided information (two signature/message pairs in
the above example). To fix the problem of the above naïve solution,
we should only use each pre-computed verify point t once. There-
fore, in our solution, we pre-compute verify points of a polynomial
number ℓ based on a set of dummy random values {r ′i }i ∈[ℓ] and
a single dummy messageM , such that ti := CHF(M, r ′i ). To avoid
store these randomnesses at the signer, we generate them using a
universal hash function UHF, such that r ′i := UHF(k, r
′
i−1), where
k is the hash key of UHF. So that the signer only needs to store
the keys skCH,M , r
′
0
, and k . For online message authentication, the
signer only needs to recover the corresponding dummy random
values and compute the collisions, which is very efficient, i.e., only
two multiplication and three additions are required, according to
our instantiation and optimization in Section 5. The verification
key comprising {ti } might be costly. To reduce the storage cost of
the verifier, one could use a Bloom filter to compress these verify
points ti . This would save over 100x of storage costs. Notice that
the verification key stored at the verifier can be public so it can
resist a verifier breach.
Based on the above idea, we designed two signature schemes
LiS1 and LiS2, respectively. LiS1 is weakly secure and suitable for
small messages with a few hundred bits (determined byMCH) but
is the most efficient one. The second protocol LiS2 can provide
adaptive security, but one more cryptographic hash function is
required.
3.1 Weakly Secure Signature Scheme LiS1
Description of LiS1. This scheme relies on a universal hash func-
tion UHF, a chameleon hash function CHF, and a Bloom filter BF,
which are defined in Section 2. The algorithms of the proposed
scheme LiS1 are shown in Figure 4. Basically, LiS1 consists of three
functions which are briefly illustrated as follows:
• Initialization: A signer idC first runs the key generation al-
gorithm of the chameleon hash function (skCH,pkCH)
$
←
CHKGen(1κ ) to generate a pair of secret/public key, and sam-
ples a random key k
$
← KUH for the universal hash function
UHF, a random messageM
$
←MCH, and an initial random
value r ′
0
. Through the parameter aux, idC should be able to
parse the ‘false positive parameter’ ϵ of the Bloom filter from
it. A Bloom filter instance BF is initialized by BF.Init(ℓ, ϵ).
For i ∈ [ℓ], idC generates ℓ dummy random values such that
r ′i := UHF(k, r
′
i−1), and the verify points ti := CHF(M, r
′
i ) for
future use. Meanwhile, idC inserts those verify points into
the Bloom filter BF.Insert(ti ).1 A random variable r ′ := r ′
1
which is used for generating the next signature. Note that
if any r ′i = r
′
j for i , j then idC re-run the key generation
algorithm. Eventually, the secret key and the verification key
of idC are skidC := (skCH,k, r
′,M) and vkidC := (BF,pkCH).
The verification key vkidC := (BF,pkCH) will be sent to po-
tential verifier(s), and the secret key skidC will be stored pri-
vately by the signer idC. To authenticate the first verification
1
Notice that, even if false positives happen in the initialization phase, they would not
affect the correctness and security of our signature schemes.
key, the signer can either transmit it to the designated veri-
fier via a secure channel (that is isolated from adversaries)
or ask a trustworthy third party to sign it digitally.
• Signing: Upon obtaining a messagem that requires authen-
tication, idC first retrieves the stored secret key skidC :=
(skCH,k, r
′,M). Thanks to the trapdoor collisions property
of CHF, idC can compute the signature x for m as x :=
CHColl(skCH, r ′,M,m). Then, idC can sendm together with
the signature x to the verifier. After this , idC updates the
dummy randomness r ′ to the next one as r ′ := UHF(k, r ′).
In fact, the update of the dummy randomness can be done at
any time before the next message authentication is carried
out, so its performance overhead can possibly be hidden in
the background.
• Verification: Upon receiving a messagem and its signature x
from the signer idC, the verifier idS verifies it by checking
that whether the resultant hash value t = CHF(m,x) is in
the Bloom filter, i.e., BF.Check(t).
Correctness. Since the Bloom filter does not have any false nega-
tive, for every x := LiS1.Sign(skidC ,m), it must have that
BF.Check(CHF(m,x)) = 1 since CHF(m,x) = CHF(m′i , ti ) which
is inserted into BF during initialization.
Remark 1. To obtain better online efficiency, the signer could com-
pute the universal hash operations offline (or during its idle time). Of
course, the signer can also pre-compute and cache many such uni-
versal hash values as online/offline signature schemes [11, 12]. Then
the signer only needs to run CHColl in the online signing phase, and
therefore the signing algorithm could be approximately 2x faster.
3.2 Adaptively Secure Signature Scheme LiS2
In this subsection, we introduce a signature scheme LiS2 that can
resist adaptively chosen message attacks. LiS2 is basically derived
from LiS1 by using an additional cryptographic hash function h1 :
{0, 1}∗ →MCH which will be modeled as a random oracle. Hence
LiS2 can be used to authenticate a message with an arbitrary size,
unlike LiS1, which is constrained by the size ofMCH. We let RCH =
{0, 1}ℓr be the randomness used in this construction. Besides, the
universal hash function is replaced with another hash function
h2 : {0, 1}
∗ → RCH.
2
Here we prefer to use an OAEP alike approach [19] for achiev-
ing adaptive security (i.e., binding a randomness to each message
using h) so that it can have an optimal signing efficiency. Although
there might be an alternative generic transformation from a weakly
secure signature to an adaptively secure signature such as [20], it
is less computationally efficient than ours.
Description of LiS2. The algorithms of the proposed scheme LiS2
are shown in Figure 5. LiS2 consists of three functions which are
briefly illustrated as follows:
• Initialization: The signer idC first runs the key generation
algorithm of the chameleon hash function (skCH,pkCH)
$
←
CHKGen(1κ ) to generate a pair of secret/public key, and
samples a random key k
$




One of the reasons for using h2 is that it could help a party (e.g., verifier shown in
Figure 7) to quickly compute the non-sequentially generated randomness.
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For i ∈ [ℓ]:
r ′i := UHF(k, r
′
i−1)
ti := CHF(M, r ′i )
BF.Insert(ti )
r ′ := r ′
1
; skidC := (skCH,k, r
′,M)
vkidC := (BF,pkCH)
Return (skidC ,vkidC )
LiS1.Sign(skidC ,m):
x := CHColl(skCH, r ′,M,m)







Figure 4: Algorithms of LiS1.
MCH. idC would additionally initializes two cryptographic
hash functionsh1 : {0, 1}
∗ →MCH andh2 : {0, 1}
∗ → RCH.
A Bloom filter instance BF is initialized by BF.Init(ℓ, ϵ). For
i ∈ [ℓ], idC generates ℓ dummy random values such that
r ′i := h2(k | |i), and the verify points ti := CHF(M, r
′
i ) for
the future use. Meanwhile, idC inserts those verify points
into the Bloom filter BF.Insert(ti ). idC initializes a counter
cnt = 0 to count the number of generated signatures. As
a final outcome of the procedure, the secret key and the
public verification key of idC are skidC := (skCH,k,M, cnt)
and vkidC := (BF,pkCH).
• Signing: To authenticate a message m, idC first samples a
random value N
$
← R2, and computes y := h(m | |N ) and
r ′cnt := h(k | |cnt). After this, it updates the counter cnt =
cnt + 1. Then the signer idC generates the signature x for y
as x := CHColl(skCH, r ′i ,M,y), and sends the tuple (m,N ,x)
to the verifier.
• Verification: Upon receiving (m,N ,x), the verifier idS verifies
it by checking that whether the resultant hash value t =
CHF(h1(m | |N ),x) is in the Bloom filter.
Correctness. The correctness of LiS2 is implied by LiS1. The newly
added random value N and the hash operations do not change the
authentication property.
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security results of our proposed
schemes with formal proofs in the standard model.
4.1 Security Analysis of LiS1
Theorem 4.1. We assume the chameleon hash function CHF and
the universal hash function UHF are secure as defined in Section 2.
Then LiS1 with given parameters κ and ℓ is secure against selective
chosen message attacks with advantage
AdvSIG
A,LiS1




The full proof of Theorem 4.1 is presented in Appendix B. In
Table 1, we summarize sequence of games to present the main ideas
of the proof.
Table 1: Sequence of games for LiS1
Game Description & Modification
0 Real experiment following original algorithms
1 Replace each output of the universal hash function UHF with a
uniform random value
2 Randomly generate a signature xi for each messagemi instead of
running CHColl. The output of CHColl is statistically close to a
uniform random value
3 Reduce the security to that of the chameleon hash function CHF
4 Reduce the security to the false positive error of Bloom Filter BF
4.2 Security Analysis of LiS2
Theorem 4.2. We assume the chameleon hash function CHF is
secure as defined in Section 2, and the hash function h is modeled as
a random oracle. Then LiS2 with given parameters κ and ℓ is secure
against adaptive chosen message attacks with advantage
AdvSIG
A,LiS2







The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 4.1.
Here we mainly explain why the random oracle h and nonce N
can work to provide adaptive security. Recall that, to reduce the
security of LiS1 to that of chameleon hash in the proof of Theorem
4.1, we generated ℓ dummy random messages and random values
{(m′i , r
′
i )}i ∈[ℓ]. The key point in the reduction is how to use the
random oracle to map a messagem∗ chosen by the adversary to
the pre-sampledm′i . By design, we attach each messagem
∗
i with
a random value Ni so that the string m
∗
i | |Ni is unique unless a
collision happens with a collision probability ℓ2/2ℓr . Due to this
fact, we can establish a unique connection between each string




i | |Ni ) =m
′
i . Hence we can reduce the security
of LiS2 to that of chameleon hash function with a similar proof
strategy of that of LiS1.
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For i ∈ [ℓ]:
r ′i := h2(k | |i)










y := h1(m | |N )
x := CHColl(skCH, r ′cnt ,M,y)
cnt := cnt + 1
r ′cnt := h2(k | |cnt)
Return x ,N
LiS2.Verify(vkidC , (m,N ),x):
vr := 0
t := CHF(h1(m | |N ),x)
vr := BF.Check(t)
Return vr
Figure 5: Algorithms of LiS2.
5 INSTANTIATIONS AND OPTIMIZATIONS
In this section, we show the concrete instantiations and optimiza-
tions of our generic building blocks, i.e., chameleon hash func-
tion CHF, universal hash function UHF, and the hash functions
h1 and h2. Let p and q be two large prime numbers, such that
p = u · q + 1 where u is a small integer. We particularly have
that KCH = MCH = RCH = KUH = MUH = SSIG = Zq , and
YCH = Zp .
The Hash Functions h1 and h2. Our choice for both hash func-
tions h1 and h2 is the standardized cryptographic hash function
SHA2 [22]. Since the range of h1 is identical to that of h2, we can
instantiate h1 and h2 by the same functions.
Universal Hash Function UHF.We instantiate UHF by Multiply-
modular scheme proposed in [17]. The key k = (k0,k1) of UHF
consists of two group elements k0
$
← Z∗q and k1
$
← Z∗q . Given
a message m, the hash function evaluates the hash value y :=
UHF(k,m) = k0 · m + k1 (mod q). Some optimizations can be
adopted by following [23].
Instantiation of Chameleon Hash Function. We review the
original discrete logarithm based chameleon hash function [15] in
Appendix A. To have a better performance in the collision algorithm,
we slightly modify the hash evaluation algorithm, and we describe
our modified version as follows:
• CHKGen(1κ ): The key generation algorithm samples ran-
dom group generator д of order q in Z∗p and a secret key
skCH
$
← Z∗q , and computes the public key pkCH := д
skCH
(mod p).
• CHF(pkCH,m, r ): The evaluation algorithm takes as input a
public key pkCH ∈ Z
∗
p , a messagem ∈ Z
∗
q and a randomness
r ∈ Z∗q , and outputs a hash value y := д
rpkmCH (mod p). In
contrast to the algorithm in [15], we just switch the places
ofm and r , and this change is only conceptual.
• CHColl(skCH, r ′,M,m): An efficient deterministic collision
algorithm CHColl takes as input the secret key skCH, and
(r ′,M,m) ∈ Z∗q , outputs a value x := M ·skCH+r
′−m ·skCH
(mod q).
We stress that the signer idC can pre-computeM ·skCH and store
it instead ofM . Due to the modification in this scenario, we have
the following major performance optimization:
• We reduce one big-number division (comparing to [15])
due to our modification on the chameleon hash evaluation
algorithm. The improvement is significant for a resource-
constrained device since the cost of a big-number modular
division is close to a hash operation.
Lemma 5.1. The modified chameleon hash function CHF is secure
if the discrete logarithm problem is hard relative to Zp .
Proof. Comparing with the algorithm in [15], we only switched the
places of the messagem and the randomness r . If the adversary can
output two message/randomness pairs (m, r ) and (m′, r ′) that lead
to the same hash value, then we can use them to solve the discrete
logarithm problem, i.e., skCH :=
r−r ′
m′−m (mod q).
6 VERIFICATION KEY REPLENISHMENT
Obviously, one limitation of the pre-computation strategy is that
the pre-computed verification keys will be used up eventually. To
overcome this limitation and support unlimited message authentica-
tion, we need to design a mechanism to re-initialize the verification
key. We stress that it is sufficient to only refresh the verification key
without modifying the secret/public key pair (pkCH, skCH), so the
services running on the signer will not be interrupted at all. The
first naïve solution is to let the signer initialize a new Bloom filter
instance BF′ with ℓ chameleon hash values which are generated
based on the initial seed r ′
ℓ
andM as in LiS1.KGen. To this end, it
has to send BF′ to the verifiers together with a signature that can
be verified by the current verification key. However, this solution
requires the signer to run the expensive key generation algorithm,
and thus, it is not favorable in practice.
To free the signer from updating the verification key, we develop
two solutions as follows.
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Server-aided Replenishment (SAR): The signer can outsource
the re-initialization job of the new Bloom filter instance BF′ to a
trusted server (which is not the verifier). Then, the outsourcing
server who knows the dummy randomness/message pair (r ′,pkMCH)
and the key k of the universal hash function can compute those
chameleon hash values for the signer without any interaction. The
signer does not need to get involved in the verification key update,
and it can keep using its signing key to sign future messages con-
tinuously. The outsourcing server (the key generation center) only
needs to periodically publish a new BF′ together with the server’s
signature to a public bulletin, which can be downloaded by the
public. Nothing needs to be changed on the signer side. Hence, the
signer and the verifier can run in parallel as long as the replenish-
ment of the verification key is in time before the old verification
key becomes invalid. The system of SAR is depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6: System Overview of Server-aided Replenishment
(SAR). Verifiers can be malicious. The singer and the trusted key
generation center (KGC) do not need any interactions during the
replenishment procedure.
Verifier Self-replenishment (VSR): If the verifier is trustworthy
(not controlled or compromised by an adversary), then we can allow
the verifier to possess (pkMCH, r
′,k) for signature verification. In this
way, the verifier can replenish its own verification keys regularly.
In particular, in a cyber-physical system, it is common that the
messages are sent on a regular basis with a fixed time period. Thus,
we can actually exploit this fact and develop a simplified verification
algorithm. In the model, we can consider all messages are associated
with a monotonically increasing time-stamp, and we simplify the
verification algorithm (to reduce the storage cost) to enable the
verifier to have a small and constant storage cost. Besides, we use
Tm to denote a time-stamp that is in the messagem, and let Tl be
the time when the last valid signature is received. ∆s stands for the
fixed time slot between two consecutive messages sent from the
signer. We show the system overview and the modified algorithm
of VSR in Figure 7 and 8. Note that the Bloom filter is not needed
in both Setup and Verify algorithms anymore, and thus the size of
the verification key does not depend on ℓ and becomes a constant.
Furthermore, to modify LiS2, we require the signer to include the
counter cnt as part of the message, and it computes h1(m | |N | |cnt)
in the Sign algorithm. Since r ′ or k needs to be kept secret, the
modified algorithms will not be able to provide public verifiability,
and it can only be verified by a group of trusted verifiers.
Figure 7: Overview of Verifier Self-replenishment (VSR). Ver-
ifiers should be trusted. KGC only needs to send the tuple (M ·
skCH, skCH, r ′, k ) to the signer and the tuple (pkMCH, r
′, k ) to verifier
only once respectively after key generation. r ′ = ∅ in LiS2.
The modified algorithm well fits a cyber-physical system sce-
nario (e.g., smart grid and manufacturing systems) where the ver-
ifier needs to continuously monitor the status (and data) of the
signer (e.g., a sensor), and the verifiers are only a few pre-known
and trusted machines. We stress that in this scenario, ℓ can be con-
sidered as the maximum number of signature failures (including
signature loss and signature verification fails) that the verifier can
tolerate between the last valid timeTl and the current timeTc . For a
real-time monitoring system in a CPS, ℓ should be small. Note that
we modified the KGen algorithm to let the KGC and the verifier
store pkMCH instead of pkCH for both security and efficiency rea-
sons. This change can hide the value ofM from the adversary, and
therefore, an adversary who compromised the KGC or the verifier
cannot extract the secret key skCH with knowingM .
Remarks. The first replenishment solution SAR is more appealing
and practical than the naïve solution since it does not need to
interact with the signer for replenishment. For example, a maritime
transport company can periodically replenish the verification keys
for ships in the sea every day. The second replenishment solution
VSR can be used when the signature schemes are deployed within
a factory or enterprise, which has trustworthy verifiers and does
not need public verifiability.
Based on the above replenishment scenarios, the message au-
thentication power of the signer in our signature schemes can be
unlimited. Besides, due to this replenishment property, we can use
a smaller ℓ to reduce the size of the verification key.
7 APPLICATIONS
LiS can bewidely used in cyber-physical systems. It enables resource-
constrained signers to (continuously) authenticate messages. In the
following, we just name a few examples of suitable applications.
Satellite Navigation Systems. Satellite-dependent positioning
systems, such as GPS and GNSS, can provide navigation and time
synchronization features, which have a significant impact on daily
life. The users of such systems just periodically (e.g., every 1 second)
receive signals and navigation messages from the satellites, without
transmitting any data back to the satellites. Such a widely used and
convenient system becomes an attractive target of various attackers.
For example, by launching a spoofing attack [24, 25], attackers
can effectively coerce GPS/GNSS receivers into concluding false
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LiSVSR1 .Verify(vkidC ,m,x):
(k,pkMCH,Tl ) = vkidC
r ′ ← private storaдe
If Tm < Tl : OUTPUT 0
r ′
0





For i ∈ [ℓ]:








If tℓ = t :
vr := 1; r ′ := r ′
ℓ
; Tl := Tm
OUTPUT vr
LiSVSR2 .Verify(vkidC , (m,N , cnt),x):
(pkMCH,Tl ) = vkidC
k ← private storaдe
If Tm < Tl : OUTPUT 0
r ′
0
:= r ′; vr := 0; t := CHF(h1(m | |N | |cnt),x)





If tcnt = t :
vr := 1; Tl := Tm
OUTPUT vr
Figure 8: The Modified Verification Algorithms.
location and navigation solutions. To prevent spoofing attacks, LiS1
can be used to authenticate GPS/GNSS signals and messages. In
this application, the verification key of the satellite can be refreshed
using server-aided replenishment (SAR). For example, the satellite
control center on the ground can periodically (say every week)
publish a new Bloom Filter instance for the GPS/GNSS devices on
the ground to verify the signatures.
Maritime Systems. One of the most important systems used on
ships is the automatic identification system (AIS). It can show some
information about vessels such as unique identification, position,
course, and speed. AIS is intended to assist watch-standing officers
on a vessel and allow maritime authorities to track and monitor
vessel movements. The AIS information provided by those vessels
is the primary method of collision avoidance for water transports.
In practice, we need a very accurate position of a ship when it is in
busy waters and harbors. Our LiS2 can be a solution to broadcast
authenticated AIS information to different verifiers, such as other
vessels, lighthouses, or buoys, at a fast speed as required in the
standard (i.e., < 27ms).
Critical Infrastructures. Our daily life may become a dreadful
mess when we do not have various critical infrastructures like
smart grids, water plants, and transportation systems. At the core
of these systems, usually Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
are used to control the physical processes directly. To make sure
that the PLCs are running correctly and are controlling the pro-
cesses, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
in a control center monitor the processes remotely in real-time. It is,
therefore, crucial for SCADA to verify the authenticity of the data
obtained from PLCs. One can integrate LiS1/LiS2 into the firmware
of PLCs and authenticate each data sent to the SCADA. Depending
on whether the inputs of the signer can be adaptively affected by
the adversaries, one can choose to use LiS1 or LiS2. Apparently,
LiS1/LiS2 can be applied to sensors as well, because, as its nature,
a sensor continuously reports its measurement to a server. In this
case, having a lightweight signature integrated will prove the au-
thenticity of the sensor data to the server so that this can prevent
sensor data injection attacks via digital channels [5, 26]. In the
meantime, with our VSR replenishment scheme, the verification































Figure 9: Runtime of LiS1.Verify.
keys of PLCs can be easily replenished by a trusted SCADAs (or
other local servers) themselves.
8 COMPARISON AND BENCHMARK
Comparison. Here we compare the security features and perfor-
mance between our signature schemes and some related works,
including Schnorr [9], Yao and Zhao’s Γ-1 and Γ-2 [12], and SEMECS
[13]. Let ‘CMAu’ and ‘PV’ denote continuous message authenti-
cation and public verifiability, respectively. And let ‘SKR’ denote
signer key replenishment (i.e., whether it needs to replenish signing
key), and ‘VKR’ denote verifier key replenishment. Note that our
concrete signature schemes LiS1 and LiS2 can have further variants
with different verification key replenishment solutions. So we use
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Figure 11: Size of Verification Key of LiS with SAR.
the superscripts ‘SAR’ and ‘VSR’ to indicate them, respectively. We
use ‘A’, ‘M’, ‘E’, ‘I’, ‘U’, and ‘H’ to denote addition, scalar multiplica-
tion, exponentiation, inversion, universal hash function, and hash
function, respectively. ‘SEUF-(w)CMA’ stands for strong existential
unforgeability (weak) chosen message attacks.
The comparison is presented in Table 3. Comparing with Yao and
Zhao’s online/offline signatures, our schemes have a much shorter
key size for either the signer or the verifier. Besides, our schemes
do not need to replenish the signing keys. Although our signing
algorithm is slightly more expensive than the online/offline signa-
tures, our signature schemes still have a practical performance. Also,
compared with Schnorr’s signature, our signing algorithm is more
efficient as Schnorr’s signature requires modular exponentiation,
which does not fit any resource-constrained devices in CPS [27].
Although our schemes’ the key size of the signer is slightly longer
than that of SEMECS [13], we outperform SEMECS with respect to





have near optimal storage costs (implied
by the optimal key size) for both signer and verifier so that they
well fit cyber-physical systems (such as smart grids) which do not
require public verifiability.
Implementations and Evaluations. In this section, we show the
practicality of our proposed family of lightweight signature schemes
LiS = (LiS1, LiS2). All benchmark results reported in Table 2 were
obtained on an Intel Core i7-4770K from the server side, and a
Raspberry Pi 3 from the client side. The operating system of the
server is Ubuntu 16.04, which runs in a VMWare virtual machine,
and only one core of the CPU is used. Note that we set |p | = 1024
and |q | = 320, and use SHA2 [22] to implement the hash function h
in LiS2. The implementation of SHA2 is taken from the highly opti-
mized MIRACL library [28]. We benchmarked the Bloom filter with
different error parameters (i.e., 10
−3, 10−6, 10−9, 10−12), and they
resulted in similar performance. Hence, we fix the parameter 10
−9
(as an example) to show the computational cost of our signature
schemes.
The performance of the Sign and Verify algorithms of LiS1 are
presented in Table 2 and Figure 9. Notice that in LiSV SR
1
, if the
signer does not send signatures in a few time slots, then the verifier
will have to fast forward the universal hash function to skip these
time slots and generate the correct dummy randomness for next
signature verification (see Figure 8 for details). The size of hash
input is 1KB for testing
3
. We stress that hashing 1KB only takes 0.32
microseconds (µs) on the server (which is much faster than other
operations such asmodular exponentiation), so wewill omit it while
calculating the performance on the server side. The performances
of the KGen algorithms are shown in Figure 10. Also, the size of
verification keys is shown in Figure 11 with various parameters.
From our benchmark results, we can see that the Sign algorithm
is very efficient for the embedded devices since it only takes 7.32
or 11.06 milliseconds. And the Verify algorithm is practical as well,
such that it will not slow the processes in a CPS. On the one hand,
the cost of KGen and the size of the verification key for SAR are
linear with the number of signatures to be verified. For 10 million
3
The cost of the hash function is linear with the size of the hashing message. Here we
just compute the hash value of 1KB as a reference.
Session 14: CPS Security  ASIA CCS ’20, October 5–9, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
728
signatures, the verification key is about 10 MB, which is acceptable
for most of the verifiers (even if it is a modern smartphone). On
the other hand, it takes about four months to generate 10 million
signatures for authentication if we assume the signature generation
time intervals are 1s. Similarly, it will also take four months for
the verifier to consume all the signatures in the Bloom filter, so we
have more than enough time to replenish the next Bloom filter in
practice. In the case of VSR, the verification key is just a constant
with dozens of bytes.
9 RELATEDWORK
Broadcast Authentication. A research topic that is related to
our work is broadcast authentication (BA), which is widely used
to authenticate broadcast messages from resource-constrained de-
vices. One of the main motivations of BA is to authenticate the
timely delivery of messages, somost of the existing BA protocols are
time-constrained. A typical example of BA is the standardized pro-
tocol called Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
(TESLA) [29] for broadcast authentication in wireless networks.
TESLA leverages on a symmetric message authentication code
(MAC) mechanism for authentication and a time-based chain struc-
ture to pre-compute the secrets of MAC disclosed later. Whereas,
the message and its corresponding MAC is sent to the receiver
immediately upon creation, while the secret key is dispatched af-
ter a pre-determined interval of time. However, a drawback of
TESLA and its variants [30–32] is the usage of symmetric key cryp-
tographic technique (i.e., MAC) so that the corruption of either
key share would affect the security of the whole cryptosystem.
To overcome such a drawback of TESLA, researchers [33–35] ap-
peal to lightweight public key based cryptographic building blocks
(such as (one-time) digital signature) to construct BA protocols.
Recently, Afianti et al. [36] proposed a BA scheme which mixed
many cryptographic methods including signature, MAC, encryp-
tion, and a new dynamic cipher puzzle scheme. However, the above
public key based solutions need either ecliptic-curve multiplica-
tions or many cryptographic hash operations that are too heavy
for resource-constrained devices. We refer the reader to [37] for
more BA protocols. In this work, we focus on designing a light-
weight signature scheme that has an optimized lightweight signing
procedure.
Online/Offline Signature. To enable the digital signature on a
resource-constrained device, the online/offline signature scheme
was invented [10]. The idea of such a scheme is to run those ex-
pensive public-key cryptographic operations (such as the exponen-
tiation) in a signature scheme at the offline phase and pre-store
the intermediate private data on the device, so that in the online
phase the signer can sign a message in very fast speed with a few
cheap arithmetic operations. Hence, the online/offline signatures
are suitable for many applications where the signer (e.g., sensors
or RFID) has very limited computational resources. In 2013, Yao
and Zhao proposed a variant of Fiat-Shamir paradigm [38] called
Γ-transformation that can transform Fiat-Shamir style signature
schemes (such as Schnorr [9]) into efficient online/offline signa-
ture schemes. The security of their scheme is further studied in
[39]. Moreover, there are also some variants [40–42] which are
proposed in the identity-based setting. However, a shortcoming of
online/offline signatures is that they require the signer to pre-store
a non-trivial amount of intermediate private data, and this data
needs to be replenished when it is used out. Thus, it does not fit
cyber-physical systems that have a high demand for continuous
message authentication without interruptions. In contrast, we are
interested in the lightweight signature schemes that have a small
constant-sized storage cost for the signer without any need for
replenishment.
In 2019, Yavuz and Ozmen [13] proposed a lightweight signature
scheme called SEMECS, which is adapted from the Schnorr signa-
ture. To facilitate the signature generation, SEMECS particularly
chain up the exponents of verification keys, such that r j := H (r j−1),
where the j-th verification key is computed as дr j and д is the group
generator of a cyclic abelian group, so that it can pre-compute all
verification keys in advance. To sign a messagemj , the signer only
needs to compute the randomness of the Schnorr signature by using
one multiplication and one subtraction, i.e., sj := r j −mj · sk , where
sk is the signing key. However, the SEMECS does not consider the
verification key replenishment problem like our schemes. Hence,
it is not suitable for continuous message authentication. Note that
it is not allowed to outsource the verification key replenishment
procedure to a third party or the verifier by handing over the seed
r j−1. Once the attackers get r j and r j−1, and the corresponding
messages (mj−1,mj ), it can trivially extract the signing key. Our
scheme does not have this problem since we only chain up the
randomness.
Message Authentication using Chameleon Hash. Chameleon
hash functions (CHF) [15] are not only probabilistic (randomized)
collision-resistant but also adaptable with a trapdoor (i.e., one can
efficiently generate hash collisions based on the given trapdoor).
CHF is widely used as a building block in various cryptographic
primitives and protocols. In 2010, Mohassel[43] proposed a general
construction for transforming any chameleon hash function to a
strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. But, unlike ours,
it did not build a regular (multiple-times) signature scheme for
continuous message authentication in cyber-physical systems. CHF
is also used in many real-world application such as the vehicular
communications [44], verifiable data streaming [45], and rewritable
block-chains [46]. However, all these constructions require the
(message) sender to compute the hash value of the CHF, which
involves two expensive exponentiation operations. In contrast, we
use the chameleon hash function in a different way by leverag-
ing the collision generation function to generate the signatures.
Therefore our signing procedure is much more efficient.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proposed a signature framework called LiS, which
consists of two concrete signature schemes based on chameleon
hash functions. The proposed signature schemes have very fast
signing algorithms and require a small constant storage cost on the
signing device, so they are particularly suitable for cyber-physical
systems with continuous message authentication services. We also
implemented our schemes on embedded devices to show the prac-
ticality of our schemes. In contrast to prior work (especially on-
line/offline signatures), our schemes have much smaller storage
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cost, and the signing key does not need to be replenished during its
whole lifespan. In addition, we discuss the potential applications of
our signature schemes in specific types of cyber-physical systems.
An open problem remaining is how to modify LiS further to pro-
vide public verifiability without using SAR. One may check whether
the state-of-the-art cryptographic technique: indistinguishability
obfuscators (IO) [47, 48] can work in this scenario. For instance,
one may apply IO to obfuscate our modified verification algorithms
to hide the dummy randomness r ′.
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A THE ORIGINAL DISCRETE LOGARITHM
BASED CHAMELEON
In the following, we briefly review the discrete logarithm based
chameleon hash function of [15].
• CHKGen(1κ ): The key generation algorithm samples ran-
dom group generator д
$
← Zq and a secret key skCH
$
← Zq ,
and computes the public key pkCH := д
skCH (mod p).
• CHF(pkCH,m, r ): The evaluation algorithm takes as input a
public key pkCH ∈ Z
∗
p , a messagem ∈ Z
∗
q and a randomness
r ∈ Z∗q , and outputs a hash value y := д
mpkrCH (mod p).
• CHColl(skCH, r ′,m,m′): An efficient deterministic collision
algorithm CHColl takes as input the secret key skCH, and






B PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
Let BKi denote an event that there exists an adversary A wins in
Game i . Note that BK
0
is the advantage of A breaking the scheme
in the real game. In the following, we will change the games starting
from the real game until the last game in which the advantage of
A is zero.
Game 0. This game equals to the real SEUF-wCMA security ex-
periment of the digital signature scheme. Meanwhile, all queries




] = Adv0 = AdvSIGA,LiS1 (κ, ℓ).
Game 1. This game proceeds like before but the challenger uses the
ℓ uniformly distributed dummy randomness {r ′i }i ∈[ℓ] to generate
the verification key without using the universal hash function UHF.
This modification actually does not change the distribution of the
dummy randomness. Recall that the seed of UHF is a random value
r0, and the hash keys of UHF are random in our design as well.
Thus, the outputs of UHF are distributed uniformly in terms of
Definition 2.1. Hence, we can just randomly choose those dummy






Game2. This game proceeds like before, but the challenger changes
the game as follows. It chooses the randomness xi
$
← RCH for each
message mi ∈ M (submitted by A) as the signature instead of
running the collision generation function CHColl. The verifica-
tion key is generated using the real signature and message pairs,
i.e., {(xi ,mi )}i ∈[ℓ]. Note that xi := M · skCH + r
′
i − mi · skCH
(mod q). We can rewrite xi as xi := r
′
i + m̃i (mod q) where m̃i =
M · skCH −mi · skCH. Since eachmi is unique, so is m̃i . We claim
that each xi is statistically close to a uniform random value with
distance 0. The proof of this claim could follow the proof of the






Game 3. In this game, the challenger C proceeds exactly like
the previous game but adds an abort rule. Namely, C aborts if the
adversary submits a tuple (m∗,x∗) which leads to a collision to one
of those hash values recorded in BF, i.e.,CHF(m∗,x∗) = CHF(M, r ′i )
for some r ′i . If this case occurs with a non-negligible probability
AdvCH
A,CHF(κ), then we can construct an efficient algorithm F by
using A to break the security of the chameleon hash function.
Specifically, F could simulate the signature game forA while re-
ceiving a challenge public key pk∗CH from the chameleon hash chal-
lenger. However, without knowing the secret key sk∗CH, F cannot
compute the collisions online as done in LiS1. Instead, F uses the
real signatures randomly chosen as the previous game to generate
the verification key rather than using dummy message/randomness
pairs. This change is possible because of the modifications in the
previous games.







Game 4. In this game, C proceeds as before, but aborts if the adver-
saryA submits a tuple (m∗,x∗) such that Check(CHF(m∗,x∗)) = 1
and (m∗,x∗) has not been queried by the adversary before, i.e., A
finds a false positive error of BF. By applying the false positive





] + 2−ϵ .
In this game, if C does not abort then the Proc.Finalize query




Putting the probabilities altogether in the above games, we have
the following probability:
Adv0 ≤ AdvCHA,CHF(κ) + 2
−ϵ
, which is the result of Theorem 4.1.
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